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Abstract  
We elaborate Le Grand’s thesis of `knights and knaves’ in terms of clinical excellence awards 
(CEAs), the `financial bonuses’ which are paid to over half of all English hospital specialists and 
which can be as much as £75,000 (€92,000) per year in addition to an NHS (National Health 
Service) salary. Knights are “individuals who are motivated to help others for no private reward’ 
while knaves are ‘self-interested individuals who are motivated to help others only if by doing 
so they will serve their private interests.’ Doctors (individually and collectively) exhibit both 
traits but explanations of the inter-relationship between them have remained neglected.  
Through a textual analysis of written responses to a recent review of CEAs, we examine the 
`knightly’ and `knavish’ arguments used by medical professional stakeholders in defending 
these CEAs. While doctors promote their knightly claims, they are also knavish in shaping the 
preferences of and options for policy-makers. Policy-makers continue to support CEAs but have 
introduced revised criteria for CEAs, putting pressure on the medical profession to accept 
reforms. CEAs illustrate the enduring and flexible power of the medical profession in the UK in 
colonising reforms to their pay, and also the subtle inter-relationship between knights and 
knaves in health policy.  
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i 
This paper applies Le Grand’s (2003) notion of knights and knaves to the hitherto neglected 
aspect of (hospital) doctors’ pay in England. This attention on doctors’ pay is likely to reveal 
significant patterns of power in terms of the medical profession’s strategies to anticipate and 
deflect external threats. Indeed, the profession may counter these challenges of reform and 
instead secure continued autonomy and control. One such reform (or prospect of reform) 
might be the 2011 government consultation regarding the future of clinical excellence awards, 
the financial `bonuses’ awarded to senior hospital doctors and clinical academics.  
 
The paper is divided into five sections. The first elaborates Le Grand’s thesis of knights and 
knaves in public service organisations, and applies this to the English medical profession. The 
second describes CEAs in terms of their origins, history and purpose. The third summarises the 
methods conducted in an empirical study of secondary data sources. Findings are presented in 
the fourth section in terms of key two themes: pay and income, and new professionalism. The 
final section offers a re-assessment of the knights/knaves thesis. 
 
Knights, knaves and doctors 
 
This paper draws on ideas from Le Grand’s (2003) book Motivation, agency and public policy. 
The book was seminal in that its heuristic devices showed the ways in which motivation and 
agency were implicated in the design and implementation of public policy (Klein, 2012).  It 
sought ‘to capture policy-makers’ perceptions of reality and to show how this has affected 
policy design’ (p.17). Although Titmuss’ earlier work had examined altruism and self-interest 
(Deakin, 1993; Deakin and Mann, 1999), Le Grand adopted metaphorical uses of notions of 
knights and knaves, as well as queens and pawns.  
 
Here, we focus on the way Le Grand addressed motivation, which he defined as ‘the internal 
desires or preferences that incite action’ (p.2). He argues that both knights and knaves could be 
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applied to suppliers, users of services and tax-payers. But he uses these terms  heuristically, a 
‘shorthand for describing individuals’ motivations, not necessarily individuals themselves’ 
(p.24). His conceptualisation of human agency has, however, been questioned as unrealistic by 
Greener (2002) who prefers Bourdieu’s (1990) notion of `habitus’ as it denotes a ‘set of 
dispositions that incline agents to act and react in certain ways’ (p.691).  
 
According to Le Grand (2003), knights are ‘individuals who are motivated to help others for no 
private reward…’ (p.26). These individuals are altruistic and public-spirited, foregoing their own 
interests in favour of others (at an individual or societal level). In terms of practitioners, knights 
have traditionally been perceived as occupational groups such as ‘professionals such as doctors 
and teachers’ (p.5). These groups were seen to be motivated by ethics and vocation, heavily 
influenced by professional norms and socialised into professional values (Exworthy and Halford, 
1999; Freidson, 1994). Furthermore, social norms have often valued such knightly behaviour 
through, for example, higher incomes, status or autonomy. Le Grand notes that medicine has 
traditionally been illustrative of knightly behaviour rather than self-interested knavery. 
Examples of this include the Hippocratic oath, professional norms of working beyond 
contracted hours and claims of working ‘in the best interests of the patient.’ By contrast, 
knaves are ‘self-interested individuals who are motivated to help others only if by doing so they 
will serve their private interests’ (p.26). Self-interest is multi-faceted but could include financial 
gain (income), autonomy (freedom from external control), status and power. Given the 
centrality of senior hospital and academic doctors (`consultants’) to the NHS, their power lies in 
their ability to control time (e.g., when patients are seen) and their ability to work in both 
public (NHS) and private sectors (with the potential to encourage patients to move from the 
former to the latter, where incomes are invariably higher).   
 
This heuristic distinction between knights and knaves has resonance with debates in the 
sociology of professions and in human resource management.  Shifts in societal attitudes 
towards providers of welfare have seen professionals as self-interested.  Whilst doctors are still 
seen by the public as trustworthy (Elston, 2009), such trust has been dented by recent medical 
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scandals (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011), some of which have questioned their altruism. 
Additionally, new public management (NPM), introduced by neo-liberal governments over the 
past 30 years, has sought to change the balance of power away from medical professionals 
(Ferlie and Geragthy, 2005; Harrison and Pollitt, 1994). In challenging professional power, the 
state (and its agents such as managers) has sought to constrain medical autonomy. The state 
has thus adjusted the social contract between the state and medical profession (Klein, 1990) 
which has perceived doctors as ‘largely self-interested’ (Le Grand, 1997: 158). This shift did not 
affect professionals alone but all those working in the public sector (Greener, 2002).   
 
However, the medical profession has not been passive to such challenges, often adopting a 
strategy of re-professionalisation. This `new professionalism’ (Kuhlmann, 2006) has sought to 
re-frame the external challenges (such as managerialism or consumerism) and thereby absorb 
or deflect them (Exworthy and Halford, 1999). On occasion, the medical profession has been 
able to ‘maintain or even enhance its autonomy and control’ (Calnan and Gabe, 2009: 58). 
However, in order to justify this professionalising strategy, the medical profession has re-
framed the criteria by which medical performance is measured and managed (Harrison and 
Checkland, 2009). Traditionally, doctors have been in control of setting the standards of their 
own work, of monitoring that work (through peer review) and of determining rewards or 
sanctions (Exworthy, 1998).  Increasingly, doctors’ work is framed in terms of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) (Harrison, 2002). Whilst EBM has the appearance of external control, it is the 
knowledge elite of the profession which shapes the content and format of such evidence. 
Often, the equivocal nature of evidence lends further ambiguity to this esoteric knowledge, 
hampering external interpretation, minimising control and thereby preserving autonomy 
(Suddaby and Viale, 2011).  
 
Here, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can equate largely to the `knights and knaves’ 
distinction used by Le Grand (2003). The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
may, however, be more illusory if viewed inter-dependently. Both co-exist in policy and practice 
and one may have (adverse) consequences upon the other (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2000). Disney 
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et al. (2013) refer to self-determination theory to explain this inter-relationship (Deci and Ryan, 
2000). Policies which maintain the possibility of autonomy are internalized (thus enabling 
crowding-in) and as perceived as fair, will enhance intrinsic motivation through extrinsic means. 
 
As Le Grand (1997) argues, it is often assumed that there will be no impact from the 
introduction of, say, a ‘knave strategy on knightly behaviour’. Yet, it cannot be held that knights 
would continue as before since ‘a knave directed strategy may make the knights behave more 
knavishly’ (p.162). Le Grand (1997) presents a hypothetical argument about the introduction of 
performance-related pay (PRP), which is germane to the application of his ideas later in this 
paper. He pre-supposes that doctors are behaving in a knightly way and that they are paid a 
salary. He refers to a group of knavish doctors who might be ‘spending time on the golf course 
or managing their investment portfolio’. Even though the latter group are a minority, they are 
damaging the hospital’s reputation. He then considers the impact of PRP.  
Since they are not motivated by economic self-interest, this will leave the knights’ 
motivational structure untouched: they will still derive the same reward as before from 
doing good to patients.... The knaves, on the other hand, will see that it is now in their 
self-interest to perform their duties properly and will react accordingly. What the new 
structure will have done, therefore, is bring the knaves into line, ensuring that they 
perform as least as well as the knights (p.161). 
 
In this case, doctors as knaves will become `free-riders’, getting paid additionally for work they 
would have done anyway. Yet, if financial incentives are (too closely) linked to managerial 
objectives, it is likely that doctors’ internal motivation will be ‘crowded out’ by extrinsic factors 
(Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Marshall and Harrison, 2005). Conversely, if doctors ‘feel’ 
that they ‘own’ the PRP scheme (the process by which they are determined and allocated), then 
the effect might be the opposite, a ‘crowding in’ effect.  However, the scale and direction of the 
effect may be conditional upon three factors. First, doctors may have a ‘reward expectancy’ 
(Cho and Parry, 2012) which is a `target income’ to which they aspire. This may be comparable 
with others professions (such as lawyers or accountants) whom they see as equivalent. Second, 
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there might be a threshold beyond which additional income has a decreasing marginal effect 
(and possibly, even negative effect) upon their motivation. Thus, extrinsic motivation might be 
significant up to a certain threshold but, beyond that, intrinsic motivation becomes more 
prevalent (Klein, 2012). If the profession secures incomes beyond the threshold, it may appear 
that the members of the profession are solely concerned with intrinsic matters. Third, it may be 
that the financial amounts per se matter less than the prestige and social reputation associated 
with the status of a senior doctor (Frey, 2013). If so, non-financial recognition could be more 
applicable. This already happens somewhat in medicine, with its propensity for awards, 
honours and medals (Frey and Neckermann, 2009).  
 
Yet, claims of intrinsic motivation among professionals, notably doctors, may be reliant upon a 
more implicit (yet powerful) expression of extrinsic motivation.  Le Grand (2003) suggests that, 
rather than just being intrinsically motivated, public sector professions are also driven by 
extrinsic ideas of self-preservation, power retention and financial concerns. This has 
implications for conceptualising professional motivation. For example, it may be argued that 
the existing stratification of the profession between knowledge elite, administrative elite, and 
the rank-and-file(Freidson, 1994), can be aligned with intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Whilst 
individual rank-and-file professionals are able to claim an on-going commitment to altruism, 
public-spiritedness and thus intrinsic motivation, they are equally able to eschew extrinsic 
motivation. Yet, the administrative elite (locally or nationally) can, at the same time, act to 
defend (or enhance) their members’ financial interests. Similarly, Klein (2012) argues that 
doctors may act as knights towards their patients but as knaves towards the state. This 
approach helps resolve the paradox whereby doctors, whilst claiming to be focused solely on 
intrinsic concerns, are well rewarded extrinsically (financially and otherwise). Moreover, unlike 
the sociology of professions, much of the literature on motivation does not adequately 
distinguish between individual (micro) and collective (macro) levels. (Le Grand (1997: 167) 
does, however, recognise this in an endnote.) 
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Despite such theoretical arguments, empirical evidence on professionals is less forthcoming. 
This dearth might be explained by three factors. First, expressed claims about motivation may 
not reveal a `true’ picture given the `halo effect’ whereby respondents would be expected to 
display outward signs of intrinsic motivation and reject extrinsic concerns (Le Grand, 2003: 34).  
Extrinsic factors thus remain hidden from the researcher’s gaze. Second, many empirical studies 
provide little corroborative evidence of motivation claims. Specifically, there is very limited 
evidence about actual decision-making. Third, most studies are experimental in design, focusing 
on manual workers in manufacturing organisations (where PRP may be easier to measure and 
implement) or on lab-based tests with students (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Less evident in studies 
are public sector professionals or the deliberations behind pay-based decisions. In health-care, 
studies of the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF; the scheme for incentivising primary 
care doctors) are exceptions (eg. Grant et al., 2009). Senior hospital doctors are often 
overlooked in studies (cf. Bloor et al, 2008; Le Grand, 2003; Crilly and Le Grand, 2004; Klein, 
2012). Moreover, the literature of public service ethos does not usually address financial 
matters (Needham, 2006). 
 
The evidence presented here points to the following research questions Do CEAs offer an 
insight into the motivation and behaviour of the medical profession and doctors? How does the 
medical profession seek to control the distribution of CEAs? Do CEAs (as extrinsic rewards) 
`crowd out’ any knightly behaviour? Is there evidence of knavish behaviour as a result of CEAs? 
These questions (drawing on Le Grand’s thesis) frame the empirical study relating to the 
medical profession, motivation and financial incentives.  
 
Clinical Excellence Awards – a knightly or knavish strategy? 
 
A case-study of ‘clinical excellence awards’ was conducted to explore how and in what ways the 
medical profession acts as knights and/or knaves with regard to their pay. These awards require 
some description since they are not commonly discussed in UK health policy and no other 
country has an equivalent scheme (Capita, 2011). 
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CEAs were established in 1948 (under a different name – merit and distinction awards) to 
secure the participation of the medical profession in the fledgling NHS, whose members might 
otherwise be tempted to work in the private medical sector. The then health minister explained 
that he had to provide doctors with additional money (`stuff their mouths with gold’) to secure 
their involvement in the NHS (Timmins, 1995: 115). CEAs were also designed to encourage 
individual doctors to practise in all geographical areas and in all specialities.  
 
The awards are given to senior doctors who meet criteria across five domains, indicative of a 
quality of work ‘over and above’ contractual obligations, as determined by a system of local and 
national committees. (These domains include: delivering a high quality service, developing a 
high quality service, leadership and managing a high quality service, research and innovation, 
and teaching and training). Criteria for allocating awards have changed over time but since 
2001, greater emphasis has been placed on ‘delivering and improving local and health services.’ 
This emphasis has been complemented by rising managerial and lay representation on award 
committees. However, doctors still account for 50 per cent or more of the representation of 
these committees; the remainder comprises managers and lay members. 
 
The value of individual awards ranges from £3,000 (€4,065) to £75,000 (€101,000) per annum 
across 12 levels, which are paid in addition to basic salary (exchange rates as of May 2015). 
Together with CEAs, the median annual total earnings of a consultant (from the NHS) are, for 
2011–12,  £109,000 (€147,000) (National Audit Office, 2013). (Income from private medical 
practice would be additional).   The awards are pensionable. They are reviewed every five years 
but are rarely withdrawn. 
 
In 2013, 61per cent of the 40,000 NHS consultants were in receipt of an award (NAO, 2013).  
The estimated cost to the NHS is over £500 million (€677M) per annum (National Audit Office, 
2013), equivalent to the annual revenue of two medium-sized hospitals. If CEAs were to be 
shared equally among all consultants, this would imply an additional £12,848 (€17,409) per 
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consultant, representing 11.8per cent of a consultant’s salary. This proportion is much higher 
than the usual value of PRP schemes in the public sector which tend to be no more than 5 per 
cent of salary (OECD, 2005).  
 
The economic recession since 2008 has prompted the UK government to curtail public sector 
pay through a freeze in pay increase of those earning over £21,000 (€28,500) per annum (up to 
April 2013). Earlier in 2004, primary care and hospital doctors negotiated a new employment 
contract with the government, which led to significant ‘basic’ pay increases (of 24 per cent for 
lower grades, rising to 28 per cent for higher grades)(NAO 2013). These did not, however, lead 
to commensurate rises in NHS productivity (National Audit Office, 2010).  In 2013, CEAs were 
under review in England and Wales, were been withdrawn in Scotland, and were withdrawn 
and then re-instated in Northern Ireland (following judicial review by the doctors’ union, the 
British Medical Association (BMA)). Reforms to the awards have so far tended to be marginal, 
removing anomalies or clarifying criteria; there has been no attempt to remove CEAs. 
 
Methods 
 
In order to answer the research questions regarding motivation and behaviour of the medical 
profession, the control of the distribution of CEAs, and the conceptual frame of knights and 
knaves, we examined the written accounts of the medical professional about CEAs.  
A recent consultation about the future of CEAs, conducted by the Doctors’ and Dentists’ Review 
Board (DDRB) in 2010, elicited such accounts voluntarily. Perhaps for the first time, these 
accounts offered evidence of the medical profession’s justification of CEAs and their responses 
to possible reforms.  To date, no empirical study has been undertaken to investigate doctors’ 
attitudes towards CEAs or the impact of CEAs upon their behaviour. This study does not 
examine individual doctors’ views on CEAs but rather their professional bodies’ defence of 
them which often deployed generalised statements about their members’ motivation and 
behaviour. 
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The evidence submitted to the DDRB consultation is publicly available online 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130513091446/http://www.ome.uk.com/DDRB_
CEA_review.aspx - accessed October 2013). Seventy-eight submissions were made from 
organisations on behalf of medical Royal Colleges (bodies representing professional standards 
of each specialty), NHS hospitals, and the government, among others. A further 42 submissions 
were made by individuals. We confine our interest in this paper primarily to the 53 submissions 
made by medical profession bodies. The value of these submissions lies in the ways in which 
the profession justifies CEAs in the face of potential reform.  
 
We downloaded the submissions and analysed the content of these with regards to their claims 
about the distribution of awards, the stated purpose of the awards, the value of performance-
related pay, and professional power. Direct content analysis, as outlined by Hsieh and Shannon 
(2005), was undertaken in terms of the a priori themes (discussed earlier) and three NHS 
stakeholder groups (doctors, the government, and managers). Here, we focus on the first 
regarding pay and income, and new professionalism. 
 
The professions’ statements are not affected by researcher bias (as might happen in face-to-
face interviews or participant-observation). However, such studies might be problematic in 
terms of access, determining doctors’ actual attitude and behaviour, and ensuring adequate 
generalisation. Written evidence reveals little about individual doctors’ attitudes or behaviour 
(other than those doctors who submitted evidence to the DDRB as individuals). Our analysis 
does not examine these accounts as evidence of doctors’ motivation per se but rather seeks to 
clarify the ways in which the profession attempts to justify financial incentives on the basis of 
(intrinsic or extrinsic) motivation. Also, written statements might be rhetorical devices and not 
reflect the views of their members. Professional power dynamics might not be exerted through 
these written media but rather through more discursive practices (such as the committees 
which allocate CEAs).  
 
Findings:  medical pay, income and the new professionalism 
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Submissions from professional bodies and individual doctors were overwhelmingly supportive 
of CEAs. Some sought to remove anomalies, others favoured greater transparency but all 
sought to ensure the continuation of the scheme. Very few suggested specific reforms. It is 
significant that critical voices within the profession did not use this opportunity to express their 
concerns. One group did, however, disagree with the term `clinical excellence’: 
‘The term Clinical Excellence Awards is in itself misleading.  There is a premise within the 
name that awards are dispensed to those who excel at clinical care.’ (British Association 
of Surgical Oncology (BASO) submission, p.1). 
Often, the claims made in the submissions were normative, without much empirical 
justification. When sources were cited, it was invariably partial, drawing on a limited range of 
evidence.  For example, evidence from economics and psychology were occasionally cited (in 
the form of one or two articles) but without much critical insight.  
 
We confine our findings to two major themes (pay and income, and the new professionalism) 
which emerged from the analysis.  
 
Pay and income 
Doctors argued that CEAs were a just reward (beyond basic pay) for, in their terms, their long 
training, long working hours, their contribution to the NHS and even the health of the nation 
(BMA submission). CEAs were, doctors argued, a fair way of rewarding doctors, in addition to 
their NHS salary.  
While no consultant embarks on a service or practice-improving project solely because 
of the potential to receive an award, there is no doubt that it helps to compensate for 
and recognise the extra work this demands (BMA submission, para.1.121) (emphasis 
added). 
One group justified CEAs on the basis that the scheme offered value for money compared to 
any alternative: 
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‘In terms of cost of consultants’ time, the current scheme is clearly cost-effective 
compared to commercial rates of remuneration’ (Society for Cardio-Thoracic Surgery 
(SCTS) submission, p.2) (emphasis added). 
Both previous quotes demonstrate an apparent uncritical acceptance of the value of CEAs. 
Scant evidence was offered to justify these claims; comparisons (e.g., commercial rates) were, 
for example, unsubstantiated. 
 
Submissions sometimes referred to the costs of CEAs as a `small’ proportion of the overall 
consultant wage costs but, equally, they noted that the value of CEAs needed to be sufficiently 
`large’ to motivate doctors. 
 
The BMA cited the ACCEA (Advisory Committee on CEAs; the government body which 
administers national CEAs) guide which explains that awards can be given to those who also 
undertake some clinical work in the private sector. However, doctors rarely mentioned the 
income that some of them derived from private medical care. The Royal College of Physicians 
(RCP) did, however, briefly mention CEAs as a `compensation’ for loss of potential income from 
private practice. (Some specialties are more likely than others to generate such private 
income). UK doctors are able to practice medicine in both public and private sectors, and so 
they do not wholly reject the latter (as the RCP implies). 
‘In some situations the award is to compensate for concentrating on the NHS and 
rejecting remunerative private practice’ (RCP submission, p.3) 
A potential migration of NHS doctors to the private sector was hardly mentioned. None 
mentioned a `crisis’ of recruitment or retention of NHS consultants even though shortages are 
apparent in specialties such as emergency medicine (Health Select Committee, 2013). 
 
Doctors sought to frame their arguments about income levels in terms of comparable 
professions such as barristers and architects (BMA submission, table 1.5).  (No comparisons 
were made with other clinical colleagues). The income of hospital doctors and clinical 
academics were also compared to those of general medical practitioners (GPs) whose income 
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was seen as much higher. (GPs are independent contractors and so their total income also 
comprises staff wages in their practice and others expenses). 
The highest performing GPs receive income many times higher than consultants holding 
clinical excellence awards… The awards, while of high value, are, in contrast to the 
private sector, modest; senior company directors can expect six- and seven figure 
salaries (Submission by Peter Robb, ENT consultant). 
Doctors’ arguments sought to balance the need to maintain parity but also to ensure that 
doctors’ pay did not become too mis-aligned with them.   
‘We are satisfied that, taking a long term view, the review body’s data show that on 
average consultants are not overpaid relative to their peers’ (BMA submission, 
para.186). 
 
Doctors’ incomes (and CEAs) were justified on the basis that doctors needed to undergo 
extensive training which ensured that their earning started later than others and that high 
levels of earnings were only reached some 15 years later.  
‘Most doctors will not begin paid employment until they are 23-25 years of age and will 
not achieve consultant appointment until mid to late 30s’ (Submission by Peter Robb, 
ENT consultant). 
Some comparisons were seen as unfavourable, notably the association of CEAs with other 
bonuses (e.g., bankers’ bonuses have received public scorn since the 2008 financial crisis). 
‘It is understandable that many may regard this as equivalent to ‘bankers’ bonuses’, and 
assume that consultants may, by the ACCEA scheme, simply be  being rewarded for 
doing their jobs properly.’ (BASO submission, p.1). 
Submissions often referred to doctors working ‘over and above’ contractual requirements. 
Hospitals’ autonomy to agree `job plans’ with consultants have complicated the local meaning 
of `over and above.’ The BASO submission summarises such concerns: 
‘Whilst some of these activities occur during the course of a normal working day and 
may be remunerated locally in the time allocated for supporting professional activity, 
many are not’ (p.2). 
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BASO also cites the time pressures of additional work: 
‘There is often little account taken of the substantial amount of preparation time these 
activities take and usually no account of the travelling involved and the disruption this 
causes to the personal life of Consultants’ (p.2). 
 
CEAs are pensionable which can be financially advantageous to award holders. Unsurprisingly, 
doctors’ submissions sought to defend any changes that could be introduced. 
‘There should be no reason for the review body to recommend any changes to the 
CEA/distinction award/discretionary points schemes for reason of pensionability’ (BMA 
submission, para.1.105). 
 
Pay-for-performance (PFP) schemes in the private and public sectors were cited as justification 
for the (on-going) need for CEAs. For example, the British Society for Rheumatology (BSR) 
argued that  
‘…using compensation levels above the standard pay scale is an entirely appropriate 
way to do it. The concept of using pay to differentiate among employees is 
commonplace among both public and private sector employers’ (p.2). 
Some made justifications for PFP on the basis that there was evidence of improved outcomes: 
‘There are a number of studies suggesting that PRP schemes have a positive influence 
on organisational performance’ (BMA submission, para.1.89). 
 
New professionalism 
The second theme concerned the portrayal of a `new professionalism’, comprising partnership 
with patients (rather than paternalism) and accountability and transparency (rather than 
autonomy and self-regulation)(Elston, 2009). In order to justify CEAs, submissions from the 
medical profession drew connections between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. 
Thus, in order to practice ethically and effectively, the doctor needed to be rewarded 
appropriately, it was argued.  
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‘To retain the concept of professionalism amongst consultant staff and senior 
academics, a reward system for exceptional service who perform ‘over and above’ the 
standard expected of their role should be retained’ (RCP submission, p.1). 
However, the incentives needed to be maintained and continually reinforced, according to 
doctors.  
‘A lack of recognition of excellent work was likely to result in consultants concentrating 
primarily and possibly solely on core responsibilities’ (BMA submission, para.1.115). 
The RCP reinforced this point by noting the need to recognise a consultant’s ‘aspiration to 
progression throughout their career (p.2). The BMA raised the prospect that reform of CEAs 
might even lead to a `two tier’ consultant system (para.1.116). Indeed, their argument went 
further; CEAs were essential to ensuring adequate incentives for doctors to practise. 
It is hard to see how consultants will be willing or even able to continue doing some of 
the additional work that they undertake which supports the wider objectives of the 
NHS… without a mechanism that encourages them to work more intensively and 
innovatively in their ordinary working day, but also acknowledges the work done in their 
own time (BMA submission, para.1.117).  
Frey (2013) argues that many workers claim to work at ‘full capacity’ so that additional 
incentives are superfluous; the BMA refers here to intensity and innovation. 
 
Many submissions lamented the decline in medical autonomy and de-professionalisation. The 
RCP refers to the impact that removal of the CEA scheme would have upon professionalism: 
‘The professional status of doctors in regulating independently their own professional 
practice has been significantly eroded. The potential removal of CEAs to senior medical 
staff, thereby introducing a straightforward salaried service would exacerbate this 
trend’ (p.3). 
Threats of removal of CEAs (due to individual poor performance) would be acceptable only if 
they were few in number since, it was argued, even a small number of withdrawals would 
ensure that the entire profession continued to meet the criteria of CEAs (similar to Le Grand’s 
earlier argument). 
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‘Awards only occasionally need to be withdrawn, indicating that the incentive of the 
award (and its potential withdrawal) is sufficient to encourage a sustained commitment 
to delivering the objectives of the scheme’ (BMA submission, para.1.17). 
 
Several submissions referred to the socialisation within the medical profession. CEAs were, it 
was argued, part of the way in which a doctor learned to be an `excellent’ doctor. The Medical 
Schools Council argued that CEAs supported junior doctors in this academic specialty: 
‘CEAs have been a useful counter-balance which provides the necessary incentive for 
younger clinical academics to sustain their academic pursuits in research and teaching 
despite the concomitant financial disadvantages’ (p.1). 
Likewise, CEAs for clinical academics were a reward for educating the next generation of 
doctors. 
‘They also have a vital function as role models for more junior colleagues and of 
encouraging them to play an active part in the professional responsibilities of teaching 
and education’ (BMA submission, para.1.78). 
 
The effects of CEAs upon doctors’ morale and the negative effect that removal of award 
schemes would have were often noted.  
‘Whilst one effect of an award is financial, it is also a source of pride to recipients and 
the factors of lay, employer, and peer assessment involved are significant and unique’ 
(RCP submission, p.2). 
Arguments were often partial as they overlooked the morale effects upon staff who did not get 
an award or who were not eligible. The West Midlands Regional Committee of ACCEA noted 
that only doctors were eligible and justified this on the basis of their leadership of clinical 
teams: 
‘It is appreciated that the bonus scheme does not extend to nurses, laboratory 
consultants etc.  It is possible that the scheme should be extended to include others but 
that even though most consultants work in teams they are usually led by a consultant 
and that nurses and others play their part rather than leading these teams’ (p.3). 
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This `morale’ argument would seem to be less about the financial value of CEAs per se and 
more about a recognition of their social value.  
 
Whilst some argued that fairness and equity has been achieved in the distribution of CEAs, 
following some criticism in medical journals about discrimination among women and minority 
ethnic doctors (e.g., Esmail et al., 2003), the tone of the submissions was that CEAs were now 
distributed fairly. It is significant, therefore, to note that only a one-page submission was made 
from the Women’s Medical Federation and no submissions were made from groups 
representing minority ethnic doctors. One submission (from the BSR) did advocate stronger 
patient and public involvement.   
 
Doctors as knights and knaves: a re-assessment  
 
In this paper, we examined the motivation of the medical profession with regard to CEAs.  We 
used the lens of knights and knaves to interpret the profession’s attitude towards financial 
awards.  
 
Written submissions to the DDRB consultation illustrated the range of medical opinion, from 
major professional bodies (such as the RCP) and the doctors’ union (BMA) to individual doctors. 
Such extensive and detailed data are usually unavailable elsewhere. However, in responding to 
the consultation, preferences and interests were revealed. Yet, the submissions were partial 
and sought to defend a position. As the quality of medicine has hitherto largely been defined, 
measured and rewarded by the profession itself, it is hard to judge (from these data) how far 
CEAs motivate members of the medical profession beyond what they would have done anyway. 
The longevity of the CEA scheme might also denote a further sense in which it has become 
socialised into medical politics and, with the majority of consultants getting an award; that is, 
an entitlement for senior doctors and an incentive to junior doctors. 
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The medical profession showed a remarkable degree of consistency in the content, tone and 
scope of its arguments. Such consistency might be evident of a logic which sought to forge a 
new professionalism, accommodating traditional forms of medical power with external 
imperatives. Submissions thus sought to secure cohesion of/within the profession in the face of 
further stratification. Such a strategy is significant since the authors of the submissions (from 
representative medical bodies) comprise the administrative elite (Freidson, 1994). Their views 
may not thus coincide with those of the rank-and-file. Submissions from individual doctors 
were analysed although it is hard to gauge whether this small number represented wider 
opinion amongst doctors. Equally, the individual submissions tended to reflect existing award 
holders rather than, say, those without CEAs or junior doctors. Their opinions would be worth 
investigating.  
 
Whilst traits of both knightly and knavish behaviour were visibly apparent (cf. Disney et al, 
2013), many of their arguments relied on an inter-dependence between them (Frey, 1997; Frey, 
2013; Klein, 2012; Le Grand, 2003). Thus, extrinsic rewards were required, they argued, to 
secure their intrinsic motivation. However, whilst doctors displayed strong `knightly’ 
characteristics (of working `over and above’ contractual requirements, working beyond 
contracted hours, etc), they also argued that the CEAs were an essential part of the financial 
recompense that doctors deserved. Doctors’ claims that removal of CEAs would threaten 
knightly behaviour thus appear a knavish strategy.  
 
The `crowding out’ effect of intrinsic motivation of CEAs was not apparent in this evidence. As 
the profession has continued to control the criteria by which CEAs are allocated and the 
decision-making processes which distribute the awards, it could be argued that intrinsic 
motivation has been `crowded-in’ by the continued `ownership’ of CEAs (Frey and Jegen, 2001). 
Knavish doctors would also still benefit since they may be more adept at completing CEA 
application forms and relying on clinical networks to influence local CEA committees. Clearly, 
some senior doctors may receive a CEA but may not be motivated further by it (Le Grand, 1997: 
162; 2003: 105). These `free riders’ may be contrasted with those doctors who do not apply 
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(perhaps for moral reasons), whose applications are not successful but who still work `over and 
above’ contractual requirements (e.g., long hours) and who are subject to discrimination in 
their CEA application. Such views are moderated by the growing sense of entitlement to CEAs 
now that over 60 per cent of consultants get an award. Indeed, some submissions recognised 
that CEAs had become a de facto career ladder. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are thus inter-
twined. 
 
As the profession has continued to `own’ CEAs, managerial reforms (e.g., `organisational’ 
criteria or managerial representation on CEA committees) have not significantly undermined 
medical power. So, rather than the medical profession being co-opted into state apparatus and 
its managerial discourses, the profession has been able to articulate a reconciliation between 
external challenges and medical professionalism. As a result, the profession can deflect and 
absorb such challenges through a subtle and on-going re-definition of what it means to be an 
`excellent’ doctor. This absorption has rested upon a judicious mix of managerial arguments (as 
shown by acceptance of PRP) and a new professionalism (which signifies the traits of what 
being an `excellent’ doctor is supposed to entail). This is redolent of `soft bureaucracy’ 
(Courpasson, 2000) whereby external `control’ (here, the prospect of CEA reform) needs to be 
vague enough to reflect local (here, professional) circumstances but sufficiently testing to 
prompt professions’ reactions (in the accounts we examined).  
  
The traditional norm of the medical profession has been avowedly knightly rather than knavish. 
Yet, the paradox that members who display such altruism might also be well rewarded 
financially requires explanation. So long as the administrative elite of the medical profession 
are able to defend the extrinsic benefit of CEAs on the grounds of altruism and self-interest, its 
(rank-and-file) members can legitimately claim to (only) be motivated by intrinsic factors (Klein, 
2012).   
 
Although the prospects for CEA reform now seem stronger than in recent years, it is not certain 
that wholesale change is imminent. Judging by the submissions to the DDRB consultation, CEAs 
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symbolise a strong characteristic of the medical profession’s extrinsic motivation. Its ability to 
deflect and absorb external challenges through re-framing the criteria and through maintaining 
control of CEA allocation suggests that CEAs will remain a feature on the NHS landscape for the 
immediate future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Le Grand’s thesis of knight and knaves remains relevant in contemporary social policy debates.  
However, its elaboration and empirical applications in health-care organisations and/or in 
medical professional settings have been rare. This paper offers, therefore, a distinctive 
contribution to this debate. It combines a theoretical elaboration of his thesis in relation to an 
empirical application of CEAs awarded to English doctors. Interpreting the merits of intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation is also salient given recent emphasis on performance-related pay in 
public service organisations. Both forms of motivation were apparent as well as their inter-
dependence.  However, this paper emphasised the views of the administrative elite of the 
profession; views from the rank-and-file of the profession were more limited and require 
further investigation.  
 
The paper revealed the logic and discourse of the medical profession in justifying CEAs and 
resisting reforms to them. The consistency of these logics denoted the extent to which the 
medical profession had marshalled its interests and influenced local and national agendas. The 
profession’s enduring and flexible power is revealed through its re-shaping notions of 
`excellence’ and its relative dominance of committees distributing CEAs. 
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